- (f) Obvious detailed blueprint cannot be made public but program should be made unmistakably clear in as definite terms as possible and announced steps of action should give undoubted assurance that aggressor will be designated and done so immediately following condemnable action whether directly or indirectly responsible for hostilities.
- (g) Insistence on complete compliance by all parties to all provisions GAA.
- (h) Insist on free movement for UN observers to permit observation and fixing of blame at time of incidents rather than afterward. Further supporting details being submitted in despatch. In view possibility settlement Banat Yaacov problem by practical Israel and Jordan programs under basic terms Johnston Jordan River planyet without involving their formal acceptance as such at this time (see Embtel 960 3), problem not discussed therein. British Ambassador agrees our recommended approach reference telegram.

Lawson

206. Editorial Note

On March 20, Representative at the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., requested the President of the Security Council to convene an early meeting of the Council to consider the Palestine question. On March 21, Lodge submitted a draft resolution for the Security Council which, if adopted, would: 1) consider that the situation then prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the Council's resolutions of March 30, 1955, September 8, 1955, and January 19, 1956, was such that its continuation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; 2) request the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's above-mentioned resolutions: 3) request the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, he considered would reduce existing tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points: a) withdrawal of their forces

² Reference is to despatch 583 from Tel Aviv, March 21. (bid., 684A.86/3-2156)
³ Not printed. [bid., 684A.85322/3-1756)